On December 22, 2017, the Trump administration approved supplying Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, capping a nearly three-year debate in Washington over whether the United States should provide lethal defensive weapons to counter further Russian aggression in Europe. A few days prior the US Department of State announced that senior officials had authorized a sizeable export of US-made snipers, ammunition, and accessories. The shift in US policy under the Trump administration has been misunderstood. The US government is directly supplying lethal defense hardware to the Ukrainian military for the first time, although US-made lethal weapons have been in Ukraine since 2015.
For all the coverage devoted to this issue, particularly the provision of Javelins, there remains a dearth of factual information and wealth of misinformation on how NATO member states have inserted and will insert lethal weapons into Ukraine. Getting the facts straight is critical. What follows is a primer, an incomplete but substantive collection of case studies backed by digital forensics, outlining who provided which arms to Ukraine.
In a rare show of bipartisanship in 2014, the US Congress passed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which appropriated $350 million in security assistance, including anti-tank and anti-armor weapons, to the government of Ukraine to defend its territorial integrity. Despite strong congressional backing, President Barack Obama decided not to authorize the US government sale or financing of lethal weapons to Ukraine. However, this policy did not prevent the private export of US-made lethal weapons to Ukraine.
During the Obama administration, direct commercial sales of small shipments of lethal arms to Ukraine were reviewed, approved, and licensed on a case-by-case basis by the Department of State in consultation with the Department of Defense. The US government authorized nearly $27 million of commercial defense articles and services to Ukraine in 2016 and about $68 million in 2015, portions of which are classified as lethal weaponry.
These direct commercial sales coupled with the US provision of advanced non-lethal weaponry, particularly counter-battery radar systems, were already in motion during the Obama administration. By comparison, Canada only recently approved a government decree permitting Canadian defense contractors on a case-by-case basis to export lethal arms to Ukraine. However, the recent raft of US and Canadian announcements created a false impression that these were the first-ever shipments of lethal weapons from the United States to Ukraine.
Lithuania was the only government directly providing lethal weapons to Ukraine since 2014. In 2016, Lithuania supplied 60 KPV-14.5 Vladimirov heavy machine guns for use on Ukrainian armored personnel vehicles and 86 Degtyaryov 12.7 mm portable machine guns in addition to about 150 tons of ammunition. In November, a Lithuanian plan was revealed to provide further military equipment, including 7,000 Kalashnikov rifles, 80 machine guns, mortars, and anti-tank weapons.
Lithuanian, Polish, and American military instructors have trained Ukrainian forces on these types of Soviet-era weaponry, including the Degtyaryov-Shpagin also known as the DShk machine gun, at the Yavoriv combat training center in western Ukraine. Ukrainian troops have likely deployed the same kinds of lethal arms provided by Lithuania to the frontlines. Earlier this year, the Digital Forensic Research Lab found that a Ukrainian solider reported the use of a DShk machine gun in a battle near the village of Travneve in the Donetsk region.
Though Bulgaria is not a direct government supplier of lethal aid to Ukraine, Bulgarian-made arms have also appeared in eastern Ukraine through private exports. The Digital Forensic Research Lab has documented sightings of Soviet-era rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) on both sides of the contact line that were produced by the Bulgarian arms manufacturers VMZ and Arsenal. For instance, in October 2015, Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov posted a photograph on Facebook showing the receipt of VMZ RPG-22 systems. Bulgarian-made grenades were also discovered in a separatist weapons cache near Berdyanske in the Donetsk region in December 2016. Ukrainian forces reportedly used Arsenal-designated RPGs in combat as recent as November 2017.
The long-awaited shift in US policy toward providing state-to-state lethal defense aid is an important signal to both allies and adversaries that enhanced support is necessary and justified for Ukraine. The move will likely compel European allies, particularly in the East, to reassess any restrictions on lethal arms to Ukraine. More liberal or streamlined export licensing, such as evidenced by Canada and the Czech Republic, appears to be a common first step toward potentially more robust security commitments to Ukraine.
NNTEX-16L focused on capabilities with high technological readiness levels and covered a wide variety of systems such as non-lethal directed energy capabilities, including radio-frequency vehicle stopping and counter-personnel technologies. The exercise highlighted the concrete value of non-lethal capabilities at a hasty vehicle checkpoint and in a perimeter security scenario.
The NLC initiative provides a platform for developing pioneering projects and focuses on the assessment of effectiveness and operator safety, contributing to the overall aim of making nations aware of the full potential of non-lethal weapons.
Less-lethal weapons have been effective at saving lives by providing police an option for defense or apprehension that does not involve a firearm. However, not all less-lethal weapons are created equal, and careful planning with a solid base of research must be done to insure that officers are prepared for every circumstance. The purpose of this study is to analyze the current information about less-lethal weapons and create a comprehensive breakdown of their strengths and weaknesses. This will include current statistics on the most common less-lethal weapons, as well as insight from scholarly sources. The strengths and weaknesses of a less-lethal weapon can be analyzed with the categories of lethality, or how often the weapon kills or seriously injures, and how often it is effective at ending an altercation. Each weapon will be examined in light of these categories, as well as any other merits or demerits that may arise. In addition, this study showcases how police can be trained, emphasizing either citizen safety or officer safety, and offers suggestions to implement in the future. Ideally this study can be used as a tool for law enforcement agencies and officers to be better equipped for their profession.
Trump has boasted that a good negotiator does not say what he is not going to do in advance. Removing defensive lethal weapons to Ukraine from the platform does just that. It is a sign of a weak negotiator. The eyes of the nation should be on arms for Ukraine as the Republican convention unfolds. If Trump sends the wrong signal, he risks his credentials as a strong leader.
A cross-sectional study was conducted on patients reported with injuries caused by lethal weapons from 2004 to 2014. Periods before and after May 19, 2009 were considered as during and after civil strife periods, respectively. A total of 21,210 medico-legal examination forms were studied.
There were 358 (1.7%) injuries caused by lethal weapons. Of them, 41% (n = 148) were during and 59% (n = 210) were after the civil strife. During civil strife, 63% occurred during daytime (P
The presence of many similarities indicated that both groups learnt their basis in a society that breeds violence. During civil strife, more injuries occurred during daytime, to lower limbs by explosive weapons and after the civil strife during nighttime, to upper limbs by nonexplosive weapons. Nonexplosive lethal weapon use after civil strife needs further investigation to develop evidence-based interventions.
6) Denver Broncos' pass rushers: The pass-rushing combination of Von Miller, DeMarcus Ware and Shane Ray is a lethal weapon for an ultra-aggressive play caller like Wade Phillips. The threesome features a dynamic DPR (designated pass rusher) in Miller and a pair of explosive situational rushers (Ware and Ray) with exceptional first-step quickness and acceleration. In a simplified defense that allows pass rushers to freely hunt quarterbacks off the edges, the Broncos' trio could surpass their remarkable output from a season ago, when Denver led the NFL with 52 sacks. 041b061a72